The current debate on Scottish independence
– though far from quiet – has gotten louder as we approach the final
nine months before the referendum date of 18 September 2014.
These contributions are divisible into several noticeable
‘schools’ of commentary. First are the ‘hedgers’, who strive to be
inoffensive as possible. They generally have little of interest to say.
While much of the output has been informative, it is hard to avoid
noticing that diagnoses and predictions are indelibly
marked with the attitude of the organ or author – namely, it is easy to
tell when purportedly detached analyses is favourably disposed toward
independence or not.
Another strain of commentary tries to dismiss the debate as the latest in a series of long-running historical antipathies. These reductive accounts are generally hostile to independence and couched in terms that condescendingly view separatism as residual Anglophobic atavism - although, it must be admitted, the Scottish Government’s choice of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn for the referendum date does give that impression. Failing that, friction among the constituent peoples of the British Isles is presented as a timeless constant that may, or may not, be resolved without too much thought or action on the part of politicians, policy-makers and voters.
Another strain of commentary tries to dismiss the debate as the latest in a series of long-running historical antipathies. These reductive accounts are generally hostile to independence and couched in terms that condescendingly view separatism as residual Anglophobic atavism - although, it must be admitted, the Scottish Government’s choice of the seven-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn for the referendum date does give that impression. Failing that, friction among the constituent peoples of the British Isles is presented as a timeless constant that may, or may not, be resolved without too much thought or action on the part of politicians, policy-makers and voters.
Ireland is usually the ghost at the feast of this smorgasbord of commentary. Allusions are
made
– sometimes even whole
articles are devoted to the
sister isle. Of course, Ireland is incredibly important in this debate.
As the only state in existence that was once part of the union, it’s
political and economic travails over the past
century offer valuable lessons to British observers. The neglect of a
‘green’ angle to the debate has been lamentable, despite the recent,
very tardy integration of Irish lessons into considerations of this
issue over the past few months. But any meandering
beyond these narrow, archipelagal boundaries tend to be minimal. In
some respects his is a habit common to all political communities – that
of thinking that their problems are unique and do not extend beyond or
even exist outside their borders. The debate
remains firmly, even obsessively, focused on ‘British’ contexts,
replete with wild prognostications and ill-conceived pseudo-historical
pontifications.
Perhaps this constitutional conundrum is
better understood as the untimely coincidence of two specific contexts
that combine to promote already latent fissiparous tendencies, rather
than being solely a British issue. These two
contexts are the European context and the economic context – the
convergence of which has created the conditions for previously content
historic nations to attempt the separatist plunge. Essentially, this
originates in the combination of economic ideology
and political reality that has prevailed in Europe since the financial
crisis of 2008.
Regarding this political reality, the most
obvious contributing factor is the almost Byzantine levels of
continental, national, regional and local government that has become
Europe’s political structure over the past half-century.
From once unified nation-states, with strong local and civic
government, Europe has transmogrified into a trade-bloc, an incomplete
monetary union and a patch-work political entity. This state of affairs
mirrors the haphazard and disjointed evolution of Europe
over the past half-century. With free movements of labour, capital and
limited currency controls in a unified trade-bloc under the Schengen
Accord, there is little motivation for peripheral to remain within the
previous ‘nation-state’ unions they joined centuries
before.
The deleterious economic context refers to
the current ideological quagmire in the Euro and Sterling zones that
endorse obstinate and short-sighted austerity programmes. This adherence
is grounded in vaguely-defined economic theory,
but generally couched in terms of immediate personal morality; state
budgets are directly (and erroneously) approximated to household or
personal budgets. This has the understandable effect of scaring people –
but also promotes separatism in peripheries with
strong social democratic tendencies.
The political reality creates the
conditions that make separatism viable; the economic ideology causes
alienation in peripheral nations that makes separatism increasingly
likely.
Nothing illustrates the connection between
European and economic contexts better than Spanish Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy’s recent
ham-fisted
intervention in the Scottish independence debate.
Why Rajoy, the Spanish Prime Minister,
should intervene so publicly in the domestic affairs of another EU state
might confuse an uninformed observer. It is even more surprising given
the Spanish government’s
posturing
over Gibraltar – posturing
which has seen them vigorously contest the right of British sovereignty
over the peninsula. So, did Rajoy’s intend to crow over the potential
dissolution of this one-time world power? On
the contrary, he intervened to weigh-in on the side of the British
government by warning that any future Scottish state could count on
Spain being as obstructive as possible when it came to EU membership.
The fact that the Spanish government raised
this as an issue shows some of the difficulties – even paradoxical
behaviour – caused by the growth of peripheral nationalism in Europe.
But the Spanish prime minister has indicated
that he will make it as difficult as possible to let Scotland into the
EU, not for any cohesive geo-political reason – Rajoy is doing so mainly
for domestic political reasons.
The current Spanish government is having a
difficult time. Due to their difficulty managing dissent in their
pursuit of Spanish austerity, they have (rather cynically) started
raising hackles about Gibraltar, willing to conscience
the possibility of isolating one part of the EU from another – against
the strict letter of European law and diplomatic convention.
They are also refusing to hold a debate on
Catalonia. Why the sudden urge for independence in Catalonia? Well,
Catalonia is a wealthy periphery, like Scotland, determined to maintain
their welfare state and standard of living
during a period of austerity from the centre of an established – and
quite old – multi-national state. In the case of both, such impulses are
coming from Madrid and London under the aegis of political parties that
have majorities in the ‘heartland’ of each
multi-national state; Castile on one hand and England on the other.
Both Catalonia and Scotland are, according to one commentator, ''middle
class enclaves in a more backward country - capitalist societies
struggling to be free, as it were.''
Thus, the current Spanish government has threatened to veto Scottish aspirations to EU membership in order to
scuttle
Catalonian ambition. And, while
goading Britain with smothered war over Gibraltar, hopes to comprise a
broad anti-separatist front with the UK in return for stifling these
same aspirations.
Obviously, their stance (as well as
austerity measures) have been the best endorsement possible for Catalan
nationalists. But by refusing to hold a referendum on independence they
are sowing trouble for the future - and they
may well reap a whirlwind. The same cocktail of peripheral nationalism,
class division, economic upheaval and conservative reaction led to the
Spanish Civil War. Officers of the Spanish armed forces have already
said they will intervene if
the
constitution is violated – a threat which, incidentally, went unreported in most media outlets.
Analysis
has, thus far, been somewhat narrow, focusing in separatist impulses
that supposedly inhere in sentiment, sense of self and ethno-linguistic
distinction. These, however, have always
been present. What, then, has compelled electorates in areas like
Scotland and Catalonia (and Val d’Aosta, Flanders, Lapland, Savoy, etc.)
to contemplate separate sovereign journeys? This is twofold – due to
the deleterious economic practices that lower standards
of living alongside the reality of multi-layered European sovereignty.
It is therefore, ideological and structural; or, in layman’s terms, it
is the EU and austerity.
The astute among you will have notice that the structural reality produces the economic pressure – but that is for another post. As it stands, if one of these conditions alter, nationalist votes might very well melt away like snow. It might be too late; differing political conditions have created different (and largely irreconcilable) political cultures.